Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on Dec. 27, 2007 has brought Pakistan unprecedented media attention throughout the world. Spectators and readers have been subject to saturated coverage of the event and its aftermath. Their reactions have been a mix of shock, empathy, dismay and disgust that such a well-known and charismatic political leader could know such a tragic and brutal end.
The assassination has provoked deep concern in governments throughout the Western world. Pakistan has in recent years come to enjoy a vastly enhanced profile in the security calculations of Western countries. It has been described as a key ally in the so-called war on terror, an important partner in NATO efforts to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, a moderate Muslim bulwark against the spread of Islamist extremism and a nuclear-armed nation still locked in an enduring politico-military confrontation with a nuclear-armed India. On all of these counts, the future of Pakistan matters to the West.
How are political events likely to unfold in Pakistan in the months and years ahead? There would seem to be five possible scenarios.
The first possibility is that Pakistan will continue to be governed by President Pervez Musharraf, with or without the support of one of the main political parties. Such a government is unlikely to be particularly strong or decisive given the range of interests and groups aligned against it, secular political parties, Islamist political parties, the bench and the bar, secessionist movements and insurrectionists. Musharraf cannot count on the undivided loyalty of
the army. Many secular/nationalist officers resent the loss of hundreds of soldiers in fruitless campaigns in the border regions with Afghanistan and think Musharraf has been far too accommodating in his dealings with India. Many Islamist officers strongly oppose his alignment with the U.S. and his abandonment of the Taliban. All of this means a Musharraf government will probably be weak and insecure.
A second possibility is that another secularist/nationalist senior army officer will seize power in yet another coup. Such a leader would probably be bent on restoring the army’s reputation and prestige and on overcoming some of the major divisions afflicting Pakistani society. This would probably involve adopting a less confrontational and more accommodating posture vis-a-vis some of the current opponents of the government, including the Islamist movements, the secessionists in Baluchistan and the insurrectionists in the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan. It may also involve adopting a more robust attitude towards India, since opposition to that country has long been viewed by the Pakistani army as its most sacred national mission.
A third possibility is that Pakistan will be governed by an elected civilian government, probably led by either the Pakistan People’s Party or the Pakistan Muslim League (N). Both of these parties were in government in the 1990s and their records were anything but exemplary. They were crippled by political infighting and widespread corruption; their rule was characterized by economic stagnation and frequent outbursts of political and criminal violence. Their effectiveness was further hampered by their dependence on the Islamist parties’ support for their majorities in Parliament, as well as by the army’s frequent interventions in political affairs. A future return to power of either of these parties is unlikely to produce any very different results.
In another possible scenario, the government could be taken over by Islamist military officers in the armed forces and security and intelligence services. Such a government could rely for support on the Islamist political parties and on a relatively small fraction of the population at large. That government could radically alter Pakistan’s foreign policy, distancing the country from the U.S. and supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It could also adopt a far more ideological and confrontational posture in relations with India, increasing the risks of nuclear war in South Asia.
Finally, there’s the possibility Pakistan could simply unravel, making the passage from fragile state to failed state under the pressure of ethnic and sectarian forces bent on violence. While Pakistan has survived many crises in its short 60-year history as a state, rarely has it appeared more vulnerable to internal dissension than it does today. To secessionist forces in the west and south must now be added insurrections in the north and political turmoil created by Musharraf’s imposition of emergency rule and by Bhutto’s assassination. Of course, any collapse of the Pakistani state would send destabilizing shock waves throughout a region stretching from the Persian Gulf to Western China.
None of these scenarios holds any encouraging news for Western countries, whether in terms of the war on terrorism, the conflict in Afghanistan or peace and stability in South and Central Asia. Canada and its NATO allies operating in Afghanistan will have to depend on their ability to defeat the Taliban on the ground and to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people if they are to succeed in their mission. They should not look to Pakistan for any effective help in defeating the Taliban insurgency.
Louis Delvoie is a senior fellow with the Queen’s Centre for International Relations and former Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan.
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